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Theorizing Change: Between Reflective Judgment and the Inertia of Political Habitus* 
Mihaela Mihai 
 
Abstract 
In an effort to delineate a more plausible account of political change, this paper reads 
Pierre Bourdieu’s social theory as a corrective to exaggerated enthusiasm about the 
emancipatory force of reflection. This revised account valorizes both Bourdieu’s 
insights into the acquired, embodied, durable nature of the political habitus and 
judgment theorists’ trust in individuals’ reflection as a perpetual force of novelty and 
spontaneity in the public sphere of democratic societies. The main purpose of this 
exercise is to reveal the mix of continuity and discontinuity that is characteristic of most 
transformations in the political common sense of democratic societies. In other words, 
this paper seeks to offer a more complex understanding of the inertial character of 
reflective judgment and of the difficulty of shifting the categories that define the 
political common sense. By cross-pollinating the ever-growing literature on reflective 
judgment and Bourdieu’s sombre theory of politics, we can better calibrate our 
                                                            
* Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the Centre for the Study of Democracy, the University of 
Westminster, the Morrell Centre for Toleration, University of York and the Critical Theory Conference at 
the Czech Academy in Prague. I thank all participants, and especially my colleagues at York, for their 
insightful questions and recommendations. Thanks are also owed to the two anonymous reviewers for 
their extremely constructive criticism. Last but not least, Alessandro Ferrara, Mathias Thaler and Serdar 
Tekin generously read and provided useful suggestions. 
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expectations regarding the possibilities of significant democratic transformation in late 
capitalist societies. 
Key words 
political change, political judgment, habitus, common sense, Bourdieu  
 
Introduction 
In criticizing the widely endorsed view that that the US has overcome institutional racial 
discrimination after Jim Crow, Michelle Alexander’s provocative book, The New Jim 
Crow stirred vehement public debates.1 Alexander argues against the political common 
sense according to which racial marginalisation is incompatible with colorblindness. On 
the contrary, she claims, the criteria of oppression have changed from Black/White to 
criminal/non-criminal, and Blacks continue to be disproportionately excluded from the 
exercise of certain rights. The author shows how, against the background of widespread 
– often less than fully conscious – racism, the penal system in the United States 
constitutes an efficient mechanism for depriving many Black men of full citizenship. 
Once processed by the courts, a high number are politically silenced for the rest of their 
lives, suffering from the severe socio-economic disadvantages related to being labelled 
a felon. The main problem, argues Alexander, is that the language of colorblindness is 
deceiving: it hides that, within all discontinuity, there is continuity. In spite of the 
success of the Civil Rights movement and the political achievements of the Black 
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community, racism still permeates society and the institutions in ways that citizens, 
trapped in the common sense of colorblindness, cannot discern. The association of 
criminality with the Black – politically fabricated by means of the ‘War on Drugs’ and 
cultivated by the media – has been internalized and embodied by a public who, often in 
spite of themselves, help reproduce discrimination. What is needed, Alexander writes, is 
a prise de conscience by all members of the community, a strong social movement that 
could provoke a shift in the categories of the political common sense. Upon reflection, 
anybody can understand the function criminal law performs in the US. The author 
therefore urges Black organizations to move beyond the celebration of the Civil Rights 
movement, resist the force of ‘Black success’ tokenism, and think about how the 
disenfranchising machine can be stopped. 
Alexander’s study is a good starting point for this paper because it highlights the 
complex nature of political change in democracy. She highlights patters of injustice 
obscured by a problematic common sense and hopes that the categories through which 
we see the political world are permeable to reflection. In this paper, I build on 
Alexander’s insights and rigorously theorize both her ‘diagnosis’ and her ‘therapy’. 
Thus, I will argue that Pierre Bourdieu’s notion of habitus is an important theoretical 
tool for enriching and calibrating theories that consider reflection to be the main force 
behind meaningful political transformations.  
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Bourdieu’s sociological work has inspired a massive literature that seeks to refine 
or disprove his conclusions2. In the last few decades, his work has also been of great 
interest to political theorists who see an ally in sociology.3 This paper aims to mobilize 
some of the theoretical resources Bourdieu’s work offers, without violating his 
injunction against theory for theory’s sake. By bringing together the literature on the 
centrality of reflective judgment for democratic renewal and Bourdieu’s social theory, I 
delineate an account of political change that fructifies both his insights into the 
acquired, embodied, durable nature of the political habitus and judgment theorists’ trust 
in the emancipatory force of reflection.  
The first section is dedicated to that view of politics that takes reflective judgment 
to be the essential faculty for democratic citizenship. Next, I outline Bourdieu’s theory 
of political agency and his grim account of politics. The third section sketches a hybrid 
account of political change. The conclusion briefly explains why this middle position is 
more plausible – and critically useful – than either an exaggerated optimism in 
reflection or an exaggerated pessimism in obstacles to it.  
 
The transformational power of reflection 
Building on Kant and Aristotle – and on the appropriation of these thinkers by Arendt 
and Gadamer – numerous political theorists have recently been working on delineating a 
theory of political reflective judgment4. In what follows, I will outline their theory of 
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political change by introducing the main ideas they generally share, while also 
highlighting some of the most relevant differences. 
Reflective judgment refers to the individual’s capacity to judge particulars as 
particulars, and not by subsumption to a principle, rule, formula, etc. The crucial 
distinction for this literature is the Kantian one between determinant judgment – the 
faculty that enables us to apply pre-given norms to a concrete situation – and reflective 
judgement, which works within the complexity of the situation and attempts to derive 
the general from within the particular. Given that politics is the realm of the contingent, 
of the spontaneous and of the complex, where no precise, easily applicable rules are 
available, reflective judgment is conceived to be the political faculty par excellence. 
Through reflective judgment, citizens bring novelty into the political space. And while 
thinking creatively is an ever-present feature of democratic politics, in times of political 
and economic crisis, when old models no longer serve us, it is particularly important. 
These preliminary remarks make it somewhat clear that deliberative democrats and 
political liberals do not fall within this theoretical camp.5 While it has been argued that 
Jürgen Habermas and John Rawls can be seen as part of a general ‘turn to judgment’ in 
contemporary political theory6, this paper argues that their quasi-transcendentalism and 
their over-reliance on determinant moral judgment makes their assimilation to the 
reflective judgment orientation difficult.7 
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In spite of very sophisticated theoretical differences – to which I cannot do justice 
here – judgment theorists agree that reflective judgment might serve as an antidote to 
the depoliticization of the public sphere of democratic societies. In a globalized, 
bureaucratized, technologized world, the opportunities to participate in decision-making 
are rare for ordinary citizens. Moreover, in times of crisis, ‘specialists’ becomes more 
powerful. Technocrats are often seen as ‘saviours’ when the time for politics is declared 
to have passed. Exceptional times are thought to require exceptional (i.e. non-
democratic) solutions. In contrast, theorists of judgment clamour for a new conception 
of democratic citizenship, one that recognizes all citizens’ capacity to exercise political 
judgment, to make decisions in the absence of formulae. Crisis is a time for innovation 
and for novelty, for new ways of thinking about ‘our’ shared world. And, since 
everyone has the capacity to judge ‘without banisters’, citizens must re-appropriate 
politics and not let themselves be transformed into customers or patients.  
Political life is therefore centred on deliberations over what citizens – who share a 
set of common meanings – consider as objects of common concern. Through 
involvement in deliberation, they become experienced in public affairs and learn how to 
pause, to place themselves in the shoes of others, mobilize prior experience, ponder 
alternative courses of action, and make decisions together. The Arendtian idea of 
‘enlarged mentality’ – of ‘going visiting’ – underlies the fact that political judgments 
are not merely idiosyncratic, but are validated intersubjectively.8 The wider the scope of 
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my enlarged mentality – the higher the number of individuals who are present and 
whose standpoint I try to occupy in making a decision – the greater the generality of my 
judgment.9 And it is imagination that allows us to ‘go visiting’ and understand how a 
problem looks from the perspective of the others – with whom we may, or may not 
agree.10 Only if one ‘trains one’s imagination to go visiting’11 can one become aware of 
new and unforeseeable possibilities for the political life. Taking distance from one’s 
particular position, acting with responsive flexibility, and being open to a respectful 
engagement with difference are the main virtues of a good judge. 
It must be emphasized that the capacity for political judgment can only be 
developed in the company of others, within efforts of making sense of the world 
together. Formal education does play a role – strengthening the capacity to enlarge 
one’s mentality implies some theoretical knowledge – but it is the everyday engagement 
with different standpoints that enables the cultivation of judgement. We are not born 
practical judges, we become practical judges,12 through active processing of bad and 
good experience alike.13 Beside experience, familiarity with narratives – both lessons to 
be learnt and cautionary tales – is a crucial part of cultivating good judgment. Stories 
increase sensitivity and receptivity14: they are full of ambiguities that demand 
hermeneutic effort and stimulate the imagination towards new possibilities.15  
Yet, 
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[F]or judgment to be at all possible, there must be standards of judgment, and this 
implies a community of judgement, that is, agreement in judgments at a deeper 
level that grounds those at the level of ordinary political argument. In this sense, 
discourse rests upon an underlying substratum of agreement in judgments. The very 
possibility of communication means that disagreement and conflict are grounded in 
a deeper unity.16  
While not strictly determined by principles, political judgment does not happen in a 
vacuum: agents must take into account the existing institutional structure as well as the 
inherited categories through which the community ‘sees’ the world. In the absence of 
‘our’ historically grounded prejudices, judging is impossible. Through experiences that 
we share with the others, we partake into a political common sense. Political change 
happens oriented – yet not determined – by the pool of shared truths or the common 
sense that the community takes for granted.17  
The nature of common sense is intensively debated between scholars of judgment, 
with thicker and thinner accounts being proposed. Because of space limitations, this 
paper will only review three representative positions in order to give the reader a sense 
of their range. At one end of the continuum, authors argue that, in order for political 
judgment to resonate with those I encounter in the public sphere, it must be based on a 
substantive, fundamental agreement. Ronald Beiner proposes that, in the absence of the 
cultural-political background of a real community, the universal faculty of judgment is 
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lacking in cognitive sources.18 Political experience is acquired within real public 
spheres, through encounters with real others, and it is by reference to the rather thick 
common sense of a political community of actors that we can distinguish between good 
and bad, between informed and uninformed judgment.  
Since good judgment depends on the experience of the public sphere populated by 
the different others, individuals are not equally good judges. Good judges  
‘may be journalists, diplomats, or statesmen, historians or ordinary citizens, and 
they may even be political theorists and philosophers, although theoretical insight is 
by no means a guarantee of political judgment, for the mastery of universals is quite 
distinct from the capacity for recognizing particulars’19.  
Such individuals balance a critical detachment from the passion and prejudice 
surrounding pressing issues and a long and rich experience in the contexts at stake. 
Thus, they serve as examples for others to learn from. Their comprehensive 
understanding of human needs, desires, capacities, and frailty gives an inspiring quality 
to their verdicts.  
 Within this thicker, cultural understanding of the common sense, change is also 
possible as allegiances to different communities pull the person in different directions, 
often destabilising her sense of identity.  Even totalitarian regimes allow for sub-
communities of resistance, to say nothing of the diversity that flourishes in 
democracies20. While not easily, one can resist – and judge against one’s own 
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community – by making reference to the common sense of another community of 
judgment. Jenny Nedelsky proposes actual communities or imagined communities that 
one constructs on the basis of past experience, or communities encountered in one’s 
education in books and teachings as potential sources of an alternative community of 
judgement.21 Therefore, at a deeper level, political change is possible when the 
marginalized can formulate their own – alternative – common sense. Provided they 
manage to successfully woo the agreement of others and challenge the 
mainstream/dominant common sense of the body politic, more profound political 
transformations can occur.  
Moving along the continuum, Alessandro Ferrara attempts to escape the twin 
extremes of too thick or too thin notions of the common sense and proposes an account 
thereof as both located within a particular political identity and informed by ‘a universal 
capacity to sense the flourishing and human life and what favours it’22. Ferrara 
conceptualizes exemplary judgment as the main engine of political change.23 Exemplary 
judgment is both backward looking – in that it takes into account the history, the 
institutions and the laws of the particular political community within which it takes 
place – and forward looking – in that it seeks to contribute to the flourishing of human 
lives beyond the constraints of that community.24 The flourishing of human life is 
marked by several criteria: coherence, which refers to a life’s cohesion around a 
recognizable and narratable project; vitality, which includes feelings of self-esteem, an 
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interest in one’s life and a perception of oneself as living a real – as opposed to a false – 
life; depth, which is a capacity to understand the construction of one’s own identity 
through self-knowledge and self-reflection; and maturity, which can be roughly 
understood as realism in our encounter to a world that does not easily ply to our wishes 
and fantasies.25 To the extent a judgment – a political decision, policy, legislation – 
moves our imagination to see how we can flourish as humans beyond the confines of 
our local identity and along these dimensions, it becomes exemplary. Charisma, the use 
of rhetoric, and the ability to mobilize are additional ingredients for ensuring the 
persuasiveness of exemplary judgments within their particular communities.26 
Ferrara thinks democracies are fertile grounds for political innovation through 
exemplarity because their political identity is mapped by several propitious factors: a 
passion for the common good, a passion for equality, a passion for individuality and a 
passion for openness.27 The last two passions are particularly important for the purpose 
of this paper, as they highlight the trust the author has in the power of reflection to fuel 
change-inducing exemplary judgment. Building on various historical and contemporary 
sources in political theory, Ferrara thinks the passion for individuality is marked by 
independent thinking and creativity, by a disposition to disobey bad conventions and 
unjust laws on the basis of one’s critical assessment. It presupposes the courage to live 
as a self-created being – rather than a conditioned, manipulated one.28 The passion for 
openness refers to receptiveness to novelty and experimentation, to going off the beaten 
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track and venturing into the unknown in solving problems. It amounts to a preference 
for reflectiveness and learning and for destabilising old patterns as a means for 
innovation. When anchored in these passions and oriented – not determined – by a 
universally available sense of human flourishing, political judgments can provide 
citizens with a vision for transformation: they ‘illuminate new ways of transcending the 
limitations of what is and expanding the reach of our normative understandings’.29 
Our brief excursus into the range of notions of common sense offered by theorists 
of judgment ends with Albena Azmanova’s work, which proposes the thinnest account 
of the three. In contrast to Beiner’s thick hermeneutic horizon and Ferrara’s double 
concern with the local identities and the flourishing of human life, Azmanova 
conceptualizes the common sense minimally, as a shared matrix of relevance30 or 
orientational phronesis:  
[…] in order for judgement and deliberation to be possible, there must be tacit 
agreements on which concepts and arguments are relevant to a debate about justice, 
and what actors are identified as legitimate parties to these interactions. There is 
also often tacit agreement on which issues, identities, and interests to dismiss as 
irrelevant to public debates on justice; they are simply omitted from the very terms 
in which debates are cast.31  
This deep agreement – underlying the possibility of discrete agreements and 
disagreements in everyday interactions – is the expression neither of cultural horizons, 
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nor of a universal sense of human flourishing, but of the individuals’ practical 
experience of the social order. From this experience they derive a common matrix of 
meaning and salience – of the issues that are noteworthy for our political debates, 
irrespective of what we believe about them individually – that makes deliberative 
encounters possible. Gender, the mode of production, race, are just some examples of 
possible coordinates in the shared framework of reference. 
For Azmanova, political change is perpetually possible as the matrix of relevance is 
fluid and flexible, vulnerable to internal contestation. Deliberative conflicts can trigger 
legitimation crises and provoke significant transformation within the paradigm of 
political relevance. On an individual level, the very encounter of alterity makes citizens 
reflect on their own beliefs. Giving an account of the ways in which one has reached a 
certain opinion – of one’s reasons to have reasons – is the best safeguard against the 
distortive force of external influences on the capacity to judge and a stepping stone for 
the possibility of critique and change.32 
As has become clear by now, despite their differences, theorists of judgment agree 
that the fundamental source of change within communities of judgment ultimately lies 
with the public encounters between reflective agents. Under conditions of pluralism, 
visiting the perspective of those with whom we disagree enlarges our mentality and 
ensures validity for our political judgments. Exemplars, alternative communities of 
judgment, an idea of human flourishing or a matrix of reference can guide – without 
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determining – political judgment and function as sources of political transformations. 
To the extent that judgments garner public support, woo the consent of the others and 
inspires them, the common sense of the community can be changed.  
The following section will reconstruct Bourdieu’s account of politics and political 
change as it emerges from his complex social theory. As will become evident, his 
notion of habitus can help calibrate our hopes in the transformational force of reflection, 
thus pushing us towards a more plausible theory of political change. 
 
Habitus between appropriateness and extravagance 
Bourdieu’s social theory is a rich corpus, developed in the course of many years of 
empirical and theoretical work. In the The Logic of Practice he offers the most 
condensed treatment of habitus, the concept on which he tries to build a middle position 
between objectivist and subjectivist accounts of social reality33. On the one hand, 
subjectivists are bound to understand action as the deliberate, conscious, rational pursuit 
of a goal. On the other hand, objectivists reject the individuals’ and groups’ practical 
knowledge as unreliable and conceive of action as a mechanical reaction to stimuli. 
Bourdieu argues that both perspectives fail to account for the very condition of the 
possibility of social experience, which is the overlapping of objective and internalized 
structures, of field and habitus: 
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The conditionings associated with a particular class of conditions of existence 
produce the habitus, systems of durable, transposable dispositions, structured 
structures predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as principles 
which generate and organize practices and representations that can be objectively 
adapted to their outcomes without presupposing a conscious aiming at ends or an 
express mastery of the operations necessary in order to attain them.34 
In other words, the world presents us with fields defined as sets of possibilities and 
impossibilities, opportunities and obstacles, which in time generate dispositions that 
allow us to adapt to external constraints and live meaningful social lives. The field is 
where individuals seek to influence the distribution of various forms of capital, e.g. 
wealth in the economic field or knowledge and degrees in the cultural field. Our habitus 
is a set of durable dispositions, which are the product of past experience and which 
constitute the foundation of all our future perceptions, evaluations, thoughts, and 
actions. As such, habitus ensures the ‘appropriateness’ or the ‘fit’ between our actions 
and appraisals, on the one hand, and the objective social world – the fields – within 
which we live, on the other. By limiting the range of possible futures we can pursue, 
habitus helps reproduce the very conditions whose product it is. In other words, in 
internalizing the limits that objective structures set for our plans, we help reproduce 
those very structures. Habitus is thus a self-generative force, behind which there is no 
master puppeteer.  
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Similar social conditions give rise to collective habitus, class and gender being the 
clearest examples35. As the unconscious ‘second nature’, it grounds a practical sense for 
the group and its members, a sense that emerges without any calculation or conscious 
reference to a norm. In Bourdieu’s words, ‘(t)he practices of the members of the same 
group or, in a differentiated society, of the same class, are always more and better 
harmonized than the agents know or wish’.36 Given that public institutions still hold a 
privileged position in inculcating norms within the population, the habitus is largely 
national.37 The state – mainly through the school and the bureaucracy, but not only – 
produces and inculcates the cognitive structures through which the social world is 
perceived and incorporated. These categories are spontaneously applied to the social 
reality – and to the state itself – by successfully socialized citizens. The state’s very 
legitimacy depends on the successful imposition of these categories on the social reality 
and citizens’ mental structures and representations, who themselves unconsciously 
reproduce these categories in their daily interactions.38  
When the internalized, embodied structures correspond to the objective structures, 
individuals unconsciously feel ‘at home’ and know how to ‘play the game’. That is to 
say, they have a practical sense: they successfully navigate the social world by 
undisputedly adhering to systems of classification that appear natural to them.  
Improvisation, creation, innovation result in tune with the societal common sense, when 
individuals master the practical sense necessary for being ‘successful’.  
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Common sense – what Bourdieu calls doxa – refers exactly to those truths that are 
taken for granted in a society: 
Common sense is a stock of self-evidences shared by all, which, within the 
limits of a social universe, ensures a primordial consensus on the meaning of 
the world, a set of tacitly accepted commonplaces which make confrontation, 
dialogue, competition and even conflict possible, and among which a special 
place must be reserved for the principles of classification, such as the major 
oppositions structuring the perception of the world.39 
The practical sense also has a bodily dimension. The body is mnemonic: the habitus is 
inscribed in one’s posture, gestures, dress, accent, bearing, manners, beyond the grasp 
of consciousness, explicitness, or deliberate transformation. Language – one’s grammar, 
use of slang, scope of vocabulary, accent – constitutes one of the most important media 
of distinction. The language that wins the struggle for dominance within a political 
community becomes the official, ‘natural language’, a process that diminishes the 
authority of all those who do not speak it correctly. Differences in speech reflect the 
social position of the speaker (gender, class, education, ethnicity) and are symptomatic 
of the overall uneven distribution of various forms of capital. Those who possess 
sufficient linguistic capital in the official language dominate the formal institutions, 
while those who speak what is derogatorily called ‘popular’ language either strive 
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anxiously ‘to fit’ by mimicking the more competent speakers, or exclude themselves 
from public debates.40  
The role language plays in legitimizing some speakers – and delegitimizing others – 
is emblematic of how an entire worldview and its categories of distinction are inscribed 
in the body through socialization, appropriation, and conditioning.41 The problem is not 
that individuals are victims of ideological manipulation, but that, by incorporating 
custom and habit, by spontaneously adjusting their expectations to their chances of 
success in the various fields, they are complicit in the maintenance of the status quo. 
Power works invisibly, and with the complicity of the subjects who, in calibrating their 
reactions to the fields in which they function, reproduce social hierarchies and 
structures:  
The practical sense is not so much a state of mind as it is a state of body, a state of 
being. It is because the body has become a repository of ingrained dispositions that 
certain actions, certain ways of behaving and responding, seem altogether natural.42  
Because one’s schemes of perception, expectations, aspirations, and the scope of one’s 
imagination are determined by one’s position in the social structures, the world and the 
opportunities it offers look different for the dominated and for the dominant, Bourdieu 
thinks awareness raising is not enough to effect a change in the habitus. Being 
embodied and often beyond the reach of reflection, dispositions do not easily lend 
themselves to transformation through argumentation.  
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This account of the habitus underlies a bleak vision of politics. Like theorists of 
judgment, Bourdieu believes the political field is the site where agents fight over the 
construction and imposition of a certain vision of society. At the same time, it is the site 
of the struggle for the control of public powers (state administration). But, because 
capital (economic, cultural, symbolic) and leisure are not distributed evenly within the 
citizenry, disadvantaged individuals are divested of the resources necessary for 
developing the kind of practical sense that would enable them to engage meaningfully 
in politics.43 
 Bourdieu argues that we live in a world where politics is confined to a group of 
professional politicians coming from a class that enjoys considerable economic 
resources, well-reputed academic degrees, and the associated social prestige.44 In 
contemporary democracies, the non-professionals ‘exist’ politically on condition of 
being represented by the professionals, thus finding themselves in a bind. On the one 
hand, they accede to legitimate public decision-making only by delegation and 
representation, which implies their being dispossessed of their own particular speech. 
On the other hand, should ordinary citizens decide that they no longer identify with the 
speech of the representative, they can protest by withdrawing their votes, but only at the 
cost of losing any type of voice in formal settings. Whatever they do, the result is 
political dispossession.45  
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 In contrast with the voicelessness of the ordinary citizen, the habitus of the 
professional politician and of the technocrat is the result of a special training. They 
constitute the state nobility46 who has specific knowledge of concepts, traditions, 
rhetoric, and, most importantly, a practical sense of the field: the feel of the political 
game and its inherent limits. An esoteric culture thus dominates politics, i.e. a culture of 
problems, issues, practices disconnected from the experience of ordinary citizens.47  
For Bourdieu, like for theorists of judgments, technocrats pose a particular 
challenge. They are highly educated individuals who have made the transition from the 
scientific field to the state or the market and who seek to reduce politics to management 
and unique solutions. In possession of high levels of cultural capital, they stiffly debates 
sense in the name of scientificity.48 
Given their pernicious influence of technocrats within the general state of political 
dispossession, what are the possibilities for meaningful political change? According to 
Bourdieu, for change to be possible two conditions need to obtain: the overlapping of a 
crisis in the objective structure and the flourishing of a critical intellectual discourse. 
Extraordinary political situations – political revolutions or crisis in the mode of 
production – require an extraordinary language, capable of offering a new common 
sense, one that publicly articulates the previously tacit or repressed experiences of 
groups. Heretical languages undermine the common sense, transgressing it by naming 
the unnameable, i.e. the arbitrary lines along which the social world is structured. 
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According to Bourdieu, one can modify social reality by modifying the agents’ 
representation of it and, in this sense, words do ‘wreak havoc’. Hierarchical relations 
and arbitrary social boundaries are vulnerable to the destructive effect of words, which 
expose and disenchant, and this vulnerability increases in moments of crisis, when new 
vocabularies enter a competition for the privilege of articulating the new, unheard-of 
possibilities.49   
But who are the heretics who can use words effectively? In Bourdieu’s view, a 
change in arbitrary categories cannot come from the dominated: they are the product of 
this very world and hence they don’t question it. Their critical competence is very 
limited and their habitus prevents an awakening of conscience. Intellectuals, on the 
contrary, because of their historical ‘interest in disinterestedness’, enjoy a special 
authority within the field of power. Bourdieu is not naïve enough to believe in the purity 
of the intellectual or the full autonomy of the intellectual field. He provides extensive 
analyses of how money and politics encroach on this autonomy and split the field 
between those who live up to the principle of autonomy and those who do not.50 
Moreover, like any other field, art and science feature their own internal relations of 
domination. However, because of a fundamental commitment to autonomy that is 
central to the intellectuals’ identity and because intellectuals are in a relation of 
homology with the politically dominated, they will be inclined to articulate a systematic 
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critique of the social order, revealing the exclusions hidden in the political common 
sense.51  
This critique is made possible by the fact that reflective analysis – the effort to step 
back from one’s dispositions and control the first impulse of the habitus by consciously 
inhibiting it52 – is a special prerogative of the intellectual, and in particular of the 
sociologist.53 The intellectual problematizes her own position in the academic and 
political fields and studies it with critical detachment – in the same way she studies any 
other scientific object.54 For Bourdieu, reflection is not the practical and universal 
capacity celebrated by theorists of judgment, but part of a certain type of habitus, the 
scientific habitus. Only those who enjoy high levels of cultural capital, who can turn 
themselves into objects of scientific study, and who have autonomy at the centre of their 
identity can attain sufficient levels of self-reflectivity.55  
By virtue of their habitus and position, intellectuals can also unmask the exclusions 
hidden by the commons sense and propose alternative visions. Consequently, their 
political mission is to denaturalize the world, i.e. to politicize it by exposing the 
conditions that perpetuate domination – in the world and in the mind – and for this 
purpose empirical and theoretical work should go hand in hand.56  
Given the dominance of technocrats and the multitude of threats to the autonomy of 
the cultural field, Bourdieu argues that a trans-national collective of intellectuals, 
combining the skills of all specific intellectuals, will be more efficient in challenging 
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the political common sense during moments of crisis.57 The collective intellectual is not 
a mysterious entity. A research centre is one of the forms it can take and Bourdieu 
encourages networks of communication between such centres beyond national 
boundaries.58 To the extent that intellectuals manage to secure their political and 
economic independence, they can provide the critique that opens the path for alternative 
visions of the common world. By conducting research on new forms of political action 
and political mobilization, by respecting the institutionalized forms of reliability in the 
scientific field, and by taking control of the means of scientific production and 
ratification, the collective intellectual lives up to the idea of politically committed 
scholarship.59  
Having briefly outlines the view of change Bourdieu provides, the paper now 
moves to cross-pollinate his views on the embodied, durable and inertial habitus with 
the more optimistic views introduced in the previous section. 
 
Towards a more plausible account of political change 
There are a number of theoretical and programmatic affinities between judgment 
theorists, on the one hand, and Bourdieu, on the other.60 In what follows, I first discuss 
their affinities. I then move on to an assessment of the vulnerability of the representative 
accounts outlined in the first section to Bourdieu’s criticisms. Last but not least, I bring 
them in conversation with a view to offering a hybrid account of political change, one 
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that combines judgment theorists’ view of the possibilities of novelty in democratic 
politics and Bourdieu’s somber observations about the inertia of the common sense.   
Theorists of judgment and Bourdieu share a concern with the confiscation of 
democratic politics by technocrats and professionals. Citizens have been recently been 
turned into clients, silenced and disenfranchised, deprived of opportunities to voice their 
concerns. The need to reclaim politics emerges from the texts of all the authors studied 
here.  
For theorists of judgment, change, novelty and spontaneity are always possible, as 
long as there is a public sphere where talk goes on incessantly. If citizens come together 
and exercise their faculty of reflection, if they enlarge their perspective and manage to 
see the issues from a variety of standpoints, they will perpetually discover new 
possibilities for their shared political life. This is why training one’s imagination to go 
visiting constitutes an essential precondition for democratic dialogue in pluralistic 
societies. 
Bourdieu is less enthusiastic about the possibility of change and his criticism 
touches all the representative positions presented above, though not equally. In 
agreement with theorists of judgment, he states that the common sense enables political 
action by providing basic categories. And he does agree that individuals feel at ease in 
the world when they have accumulated enough practical experience: navigating the 
social world becomes less conscious and more intuitive. The problem is that, in late 
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capitalist, diverse societies, the conditions for acquiring an effective political sense are 
unevenly distributed and that arbitrary categories of distinction are internalized and 
reproduced by the dominated, to their own disadvantage. Thus, Bourdieu’s account of 
the arbitrariness of the naturalized doxic distinctions and of their stability in the 
citizens’ habitus invites us to question the optimism of judgment theorists along several 
lines.  
First, we must problematize the very categories through which the citizens see the 
world. Their naturalization undermines the democratic processes because it splits the 
public into islands. Therefore, ‘going visiting’ is likely to happen within the zone in 
which the individual feels comfortable, i.e. one visits those with whom one shares a 
social island. The privileged cultivate relations with their peers, while the unprivileged 
are persuaded that politics is not ‘for the likes of us,’ thereby excluding themselves from 
contestation. Imagination – the creative force hailed by theorists of judgment – can also 
be a force in service of the status quo, confined to what the doxa permits as thinkable. 
Going back to the example at the beginning of this paper, the internalization of the ideal 
of colorblindness obscures massive inequities within the citizenry and hinders the 
expansion of the enlarged mentality to include the standpoints of those bearing the 
labels of ‘felon’ and ‘criminal’. What is more, even if one could train the imagination to 
go visiting beyond one’s class, gender, group, etc., in visiting, one would still work with 
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the naturalized categories that dictate what is ‘appropriate’ for individuals – for the 
educated, for the rich, for the criminals, for women, for homosexuals, etc. – to aspire to.  
Second, while the capacity to judge political particulars ‘without banisters’ must be 
cultivated, while the public space must be preserved for incessant talk to flourish, we 
must also be attentive to the profile of the active citizen and see what structural factors 
make some more likely to engage in deliberation than others. With Alexander, we must 
also pay attention to the ways in which naturalized inequalities systematically cause 
some political agents to enjoy authority, while disenfranchising and relegating others to 
second-class status. And this involves, beyond the distribution of various forms of 
capital, a consideration of the bodily aspect of citizenship. Our body, as much as our 
words, discloses who we are: clothing, manners, gestures, accent, vocabulary, bearing, 
posture. We ‘code’ and ‘classify’ our fellow citizens – as respectable, authoritative, 
wise but also dangerous, stupid, irrelevant, etc. – according to their clothing, manners, 
gestures, accent, vocabulary, bearing, posture. While some theorists of judgment do 
recognize the role of the body in judgments,61 efforts must be made to think about how 
the disposition to listen to the different other, to reflect and act in the world, can be 
stimulated in its complexity.  Without carefully identifying the social markers of 
authoritative political participation – and the way in which they reflect arbitrary 
distributions of economic, political, cultural, linguistic, symbolic, etc. capital – we 
cannot begin the work of universalizing the conditions of access to politics.  
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Third, related but not reducible to the body, emotions should also be taken into 
account. Emotion is one of the most important markers of judgment: it gets judgment 
going and we judge about the things we care. Emotion also helps us select the elements 
that go into judgment according to their salience. Not feeling psychologically at ease 
debating with the more educated, the more articulate, the more authoritative others 
might – at least partly – explain why some citizens withdraw from political decision-
making. Alternatively, experiencing emotional discomfort in the presence of women, 
immigrants, gays, Blacks, ex-convicts or the poor, disables one’s capacity to place 
oneself in their shoes. The emotional anchorage of the exclusionary habitus contributes 
to its stability. Therefore, if we agree with Bourdieu that emotion and the body are an 
important part of the political habitus, cultivating emotions that are welcoming to 
difference must become a part of a complex understanding of democratic 
socialization.62  
Fourth, while theorists of judgments like Beiner and Ferrara are right to discuss the 
power of exemplary acts and persons as catalysers of change, we must concede the 
difficulty of exemplarity. First, we need to consider the strong inertial pull of the 
habitus on one’s capacity to take distance from the immediate context. If we endorse 
Bourdieu’s account of the naturalized nature of the habitus and its group-based 
character (according to gender, class, etc.), then Ferrara’s passion for individuality is 
likely to push the individual to go very narrowly off the ‘beaten track’ – that of her 
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relevant social island. Moreover, the passion for openness that Ferrara celebrates will 
also meet strong psychological and physical barriers as citizens feel uncomfortable 
outside the social, political and cultural zone they ‘naturally’ take for granted. This 
means that reaching for that universal sense of what furthers the flourishing of human 
life – beyond the confines of one’s particular community – will not happen as 
spontaneously as Ferrara intimates63.  
Moreover, one’s position in the political field determines not only whether one can 
judge exemplarily, but also the kind of reception exemplary judgments get. On the one 
hand, exemplary judgments shaking the basic categories at the core of the social world 
might be felt as threatening, and might therefore lead to a conservative backlash. On the 
other hand, feeling disempowered and alienated from politics and from one’s fellow 
citizens may make one less responsive to provocative reflections, no matter how 
inspiring they might be. 
It must be mentioned at this point that that theorists of judgment are not equally 
vulnerable to Bourdieu’s critical sting. Of the three representative accounts discussed in 
the first part of this paper, Azmanova alone thematizes the power asymmetries inscribed 
in the societal matrix of relevance.64 In contrast to Beiner and Ferrara, she is very much 
aware of the ways in which the meaning and the valuation ascribed to an issue within 
the societal matrix of relevance are determined by structures of domination. More 
importantly, Azmanova uses Bourdieu’s notion of prise de position to explain that a 
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political actor’s position-taking within the matrix of relevance is the expression of that 
actor’s position within the overall distribution of social capital. In this respect, 
Azmanova and Bourdieu are in agreement. However, she maintains a firm belief that 
the solution lies with the flexibility and instability of the matrix, which she sees as 
forever vulnerable to the power of discursive confrontations65. Azmanova argues that, in 
encountering alterity, citizens cannot but distance themselves from their own position 
and revise it. Moreover, to the extent that they give a public account of how they 
reached the opinion they bring to the public sphere, they will reveal the power relations 
at play in deliberation and will help dereify the common sense. 
While Bourdieu would salute Azmanova’s attention to the political and arbitrary 
nature of the common sense, he would be skeptical of her understanding of the nature of 
the habitus and of the doxa. Azmanova’s treatment of Bourdieu is rather incomplete as 
she does not seem to appreciate how deep the habitus runs and of how difficult it would 
be for a person to give an account of the reasons for having reasons – the one solution 
she proposes against the distorting effect of domination. Bourdieu would point to the 
fact that encounters with alterity do not automatically stimulate reflection – rather, they 
may provoke resistance and discomfort. He would also be quick to remark that one’s 
habitus – and the reasons for which we have the political opinions we have – is 
embodied: the sum of stable, incorporated dispositions through which the individual 
finds a home in the world is not as transparent to reflection and as discursively available 
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as Azmanova presupposes. Therefore, there is no guarantee that politically dispossessed 
citizens will be in a position to give an account of how they formulated the political 
opinions they expound. And even if they could expose the origins of their opinions, 
there is no guarantee they will not be disregarded by their fellow citizens, on account of 
their linguistic capacities, skin color, gender, class, education, and other forms of 
distinction. This means that, because she does not fully engage with the habitus as 
conceptualised by Bourdieu, Azmanova overestimates the flexibility and vulnerability 
of the matrix of relevance to contestation. Thinking again about the example at the 
beginning of this paper, even if ‘felons’ and ‘criminals’ were to give an account of the 
genesis of their own political opinions – as she recommends – their accounts are not 
certain to reveal the structural injustices obscured by the language of ‘colorblindness’, 
nor are they likely to be considered as authoritative within the American public sphere, 
dominated as it is by the common sense of individual responsibility – in merit and fault 
alike. 
While relying on Bourdieu to highlight the obstacles that the different accounts of 
judgment are likely to face when it comes to political change, this paper does not, 
however, endorse his idea that mastery of scientific knowledge is a pre-requisite for 
understanding the oppressive character of the common sense. In agreement with 
theorists of judgment, it argues that theoretical knowledge is an important, but not the 
only dimension of a good judgment. As social movements have shown, unmasking the 
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injustice of categories is not the exclusive privilege of intellectuals. Radical thought 
flourishes outside research centers, in alternative, politically mobilized communities of 
judgment. True, intellectuals have a critical role in articulating heretical languages, and 
the more they hold each other accountable the better; but they do not have a monopoly 
over exemplary judgments, nor is experience in sociological research a condition for 
changing the terms of the discourse. The Madres de Plaza de Mayo, the Solidarność or 
Occupy Wall Street are just some of the most inspiring examples of critical judgment 
coming from outside the academia.  
Besides social movements, theorists of judgment are right to point to powerful art 
(films, theatre, and painting) as another source of exemplary reflective judgments, more 
direct and more effective in revealing oppression and changing the way in which we see 
the world than either social science or philosophy. Examples abound. Just think of the 
debates sparked by Thomas Bernhard’s Heldenplatz, Harper Lee’s To Kill a Mocking 
Bird, or Louis Malle’s Lacombe, Lucien.66 These artistic products have challenged the 
terms of the debates in their respective societies. In celebrating the power of art to 
destabilize dominant views of the community, we must, however, follow Bourdieu and 
resist the myth of ‘pure’ art. It is exactly because it is made possible by – and located 
within – a historical constellation, that art can be politically relevant. And it is only 
when it is produced by artists committed to intellectual autonomy that that art can also 
be critical67. 
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However, even if, in disagreeing with Bourdieu’s trust in scientific self-
objectification, we point to the reflective practices of social movements and art in, we 
should embrace his idea that reflection by the good judge must go beyond taking 
distance from the particular situation at hand. A more complex understanding of good 
judgment should involve, besides ‘going visiting’, turning the gaze upon oneself and 
taking some distance – even if not scientific distance – from one’s own position as a 
speaker with authority within the public sphere. To illustrate, in The New Jim Crow 
Alexander is painfully aware of her position as a privileged, highly educated, 
beneficiary of affirmative action, and she writes in full awareness of the authority and 
advantage this gives her. She is aware of belonging to a class of intellectuals with high 
cultural capital. By looking at oneself with a critical eye, the judge can become aware of 
the social position that allows her to speak authoritatively in the public sphere and ask 
herself some crucial questions: ‘Who do I speak for? What entitles me to speak with 
authority? Why do people pay attention to me? Who is likely to take me seriously? On 
what kind of privilege is my ability to speak and access to the public realm based on?’ 
These are questions that all citizens, and not just intellectuals, should aim to answer for 
themselves whenever they enter the public arena and try to persuade the others of the 
merits of their arguments.  
This section ends with a word on crisis. Alexander, Bourdieu and theorists of 
judgment see crisis as an opportunity for radical political change, for embracing a 
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different view of the world. For Bourdieu, political change comes with changes in the 
objective world, accompanied by a surge in heretical languages. Like Arendt and other 
theorists of judgment, he thinks that crisis in the world brings about the crisis of the 
categories through which we understand the world. Given the arbitrariness of these 
categories, their loss is not something to be deplored, but an opportunity to be seized. 
Crisis is a time propitious for alternative languages to make explicit the relations of 
dominations hidden by the societal common sense.  
Indeed, crises are crucial for they show the limits of our inherited and cherished 
categories. But, more often than not, radical change happens piecemeal. Because they 
allow of a multitude of communities of judgment, and for good political judgment to 
develop beyond the academia, theorists of judgment are more comfortable with the idea 
that important change also happens gradually, through struggles that span across 
decades – the case of women and gay people’s liberation being illustrative in this sense. 
Fetishizing the crisis and presenting intellectuals as heroic providers of a new common 
sense distracts us from the more mundane dynamic of political change. This is why, 
while it is important that we allow Bourdieu to curb our over-inflated enthusiasm in the 
power of reflection, we should not join him in his elitist heroism. 
 
Conclusions  
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In building a dialogue between those I have generically called theorists of judgment and 
Pierre Bourdieu, this paper’s ambition has been to point to a twin danger: of 
exaggerated optimism in the power of reflection to trigger significant political change or 
of exaggerated pessimism about the stability of arbitrary social distinctions. In times of 
great democratic deficits, characterized by the hi-jacking of democratic processes by 
experts, it is crucial that political theory abstains from both temptations. A middle 
position, that acknowledges the obstacles to reflection while also cultivating hope in its 
power, is more likely to provide useful and realistic insights into the conundrum 
democracies face in the age of post-politics. 
Notwithstanding Bourdieu’s correct assessment of the difficulty of reflection to 
reveal new possibilities for the political life, the impact of social movements and of 
exemplary works of art gives us reasons to believe there is hope beyond the scientific 
community. Social movements abound and their contribution does not depend on input 
from intellectuals, but on the reproduction of a habitus of social activism68. Without 
discarding the importance of theoretical knowledge, a democratic habitus can emerge 
from socialization in the importance of social mobilization, rather than from the mastery 
of scientific methodology. Secondly, good stories and art are possibly more apt than 
social science to disrupt the ‘subtle embodied dynamics that perpetuate domination and 
oppression in ostensibly free societies’.69 By using the social theorist’s work as a 
corrective – rather than a substitute – to over-enthusiastic hopes in the emancipatory 
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force of reflective judgment, I hope to have pointed towards a more plausible account of 
political change. 
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